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Abstract
This paper argues that mismanagement of the money supply substantially contributed to the economic
disaster of The Great Depression. Indeed, from 1929 to the cyclical trough in 1933, the Federal Reserve
allowed the money stock to fall by 33% while one-fifth of commercial banks closed and real money income fell
36%. These numbers seem staggering when one considers that the Fed performed few open market operations
and even raised the discount rate in 1931 from 1.5% to 3.5%.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Today it seems completely natural that the
Federal Reserve Bank exercises ultimate control
over the money supply.  Indeed citizens and policy-
makers alike take comfort in the fact that Alan
Greenspan and the Board of Governors actively fight
inflation and stabilize the money supply by
influencing interest rates, performing open market
operations, changing the discount rate, or altering
the reserve requirement.  There was a time, however,
when the domestic supply of money in the United
States was not so closely controlled.  One of the
results of this inability to control the money supply
was the downward spiral after the stock market crash
of 1929, known as The Great Depression.
An analysis of the monetary policy during
the period of 1929-1935 is very relevant to
economic policy-makers today.  Perennially, there
is debate about how much monetary intervention is
good for the economy.  Likewise, politicians such
as Jack Kemp and Steve Forbes continue to raise
issues such as the need for a gold standard, which
in large part contributed to the inability to control
the rampant devaluation of currency and depletion
of the money stock during The Depression.
Two key theories fall out of this examination
of The Great Depression.  The first, the spending
hypothesis, postulates that an exogenous fall in the
demand for goods and services caused a
contractionary shift in the IS curve of the IS-LM
model, resulting in a sharp decline in income
coinciding with falling interest rates.  The second
hypothesis, known as the money hypothesis,
suggests that the Federal Reserve was to blame for
The Great Depression because it allowed the money
supply to decrease so rapidly.  This caused a
contraction of the LM curve, which resulted in a
decrease in income accompanied by raised interest
rates (Mankiw, 1997).  On the surface, observed
trends more readily support the spending hypothesis,
as both GNP and market interest rates fell from 1929
to 1933.  But evidence will show that the monetary
hypothesis also played a large role in the severity of
The Great Depression.
This paper will argue that mismanagement
of the money supply substantially contributed to the
economic disaster of The Great Depression. Indeed,
from 1929 to the cyclical trough in 1933, the Federal
Reserve allowed the money stock to fall by 33%
while one-fifth of commercial banks closed and real
money income fell 36% (Friedman and Schwartz,
1963).  The mere size of these trends intuitively
lends credence to the money hypothesis.  These
numbers seem staggering when one considers that
the Fed performed few open market operations and
even raised the discount rate in 1931 from 1.5% to
3.5% (Wheelock, 1998).
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous research provides conflicting analy-
ses of the causes of The Great Depression.  Fried-
man and Schwartz provide evidence that the down-
ward plunge in the money supply during The De-
pression was in large part a result of failed mon-
etary policy, arguing that while non-monetary fac-
tors played a role in the stock market crash and sub-
sequent banking failures, a liberal expansion of the
money supply would have lessened the severity of
The Great Depression (1963).  David Wheelock
similarly argues that the Fed’s policies during this
period were “exceptionally contractionary” and the
result of “misguided policies” (1998).  Hall and
Ferguson add to the discussion by pointing out the
precariousness of the government’s position, stem-
ming from the adherence to the gold standard
(1998).  In contrast, Peter Temin argues that the
fall in income was not caused by monetary factors,
but rather supports the spending hypothesis on the
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grounds that interest rates in fact fell (1976).
Mankiw and Bruce True provide explanations to
reconcile the observed behavior of interest rates with
the money hypothesis (1997, 1993).
It is important to note that adherence to the
gold standard and limitations on the powers of the
Fed greatly contributed to the Fed’s inability to
stabilize the monetary decline during these years.
Evidence and existing literature suggest that The
Great Depression revealed the flaws of the gold
standard and the need to expand the Federal Reserve
System’s money stabilizing role.  The money supply
was drastically diminished by gold and capital
outflows and prices underwent a severe deflation,
thereby disrupting output, debt-creditor
arrangements, and lowering expectations of future
improvements.
It was not until the newly elected President,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, suspended the gold standard
in 1933 and the Fed was given more powers through
the 1932 Glass-
Steagall Act that the
Fed was able to
counteract some of
the debilitating
trends of The Great
Depression.  Finally,
the Banking Act of
1935 reorganized the
Federal Reserve
Board of Governors
into what we are
familiar with today,
which gave the Board more responsibility and a
tighter rein over the money supply.
III.  RECONCILING THE MONEY
HYPOTHESIS
In their seminal work, A Monetary History
of the United States, Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz argue in favor of the money hypothesis.
In fact, in Friedman’s video series, Free to Choose,
he suggests that much of the severity of The Great
Depression can be explained by failure of monetary
policy (1963).  This claim makes intuitive sense
when one considers the amount of bank failures and
the severe decline in the money supply.  Peter Temin,
however, takes issue with Friedman and Schwartz’s
thesis in his book Did Monetary Forces Cause the
Great Depression?  As discussed above, Temin
points out that the observed behavior of the nominal
interest rates does not coincide with the predicted
outcome of a monetary shift in the IS-LM model
(1976).  That is, rather than increasing, nominal
rates actually fell.
In efforts to justify the money hypothesis,
several theories attempt to explain the fall in interest
rates that coincided with a massive decrease in the
money supply.  Bruce True, in An Examination of
the Monetary Hypothesis of the Depression,
outlines several possible explanations for this
apparent contradiction (1993).
First, and perhaps the most potent criticism
from supporters of Friedman and Schwartz, is that
Temin focuses his analysis of the spending
hypothesis on nominal interests rates observed
during the 1930 banking crisis, whereas real interest
rates may be more
appropriate when
looking at changes in
the money supply.  In
fact, as Table 1
shows, real ex ante
interest rates actually
rose while nominal
interest rates fell due
to expectations of
deflation during the
banking crisis (True,
1993).  This suggests
that the monetary hypothesis does not violate the
assumptions of the IS-LM model.
Likewise, Mankiw discusses the impact of
deflation on investment expectations.  He states that
when there is rampant deflation, expected negative
inflation enters as a new variable in the IS-LM.  As
expected inflation becomes negative due to
deflation, the ex ante real interest rate, which is equal
to the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation,
actually rises while nominal rates fall.  As Graph 1
shows, the IS curve shifts downward due to the
effects of an expected deflation, reducing consumer
incentive to spend or enter in debt-creditor
arrangements.  The shift reduces national income
Source: Wheelock, Monetary Policy in the Great Depression and Beyond, 1998.
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and nominal rates, which coincides with the
observed trends of the period.
Furthermore, as these changes did not occur
in a theoretical vaccuum, it is likely that other
exogenous factors also reduced spending, so both
the spending and the money hypothesis are partially
correct.  The result of such a model would be shifts
in both the IS and the LM curves, making the
direction of the interest rate variable indeterminate
(Graph 2).  As True points out, if Temin’s argument
is correct, he only shows that the spending hypothesis
also played a role, rather than disproving the money
hypothesis.
IV.  THE GOLD STANDARD
If the money hypothesis is supported, and
the decline in the money supply truly contributed
to the severity of the Depression, then why did the
Fed act as it did and allow such a massive
decline?  The system and the assumptions the Fed
operated under at the time go far towards
explaining this disastrous trend.  In short,
adherence to the rules of the gold standard greatly
limited the Fed’s ability to respond to the growing
crisis.
From 1791 to 1933, with the exception of
minor adjustments, the United States of America
operated under a monetary regime based on a
fixed gold standard.  In essence, the monetary
forces fixed the price of gold and acted
subsequently only to buy or sell gold in order to
maintain the given price level [The consequences
of such a policy are startling from the perspective
of today’s monetary policy].  On a fixed gold
standard, once the price was set, the authorities
had no control over the money supply (Hall and
Ferguson, 1998).  Changes in either the supply,
possibly through the discovery of new gold
deposits, or in demand, possibly through trends in
other uses of gold, would affect the quantity of
gold supplied at a fixed price.  Graph 3 shows the
effects of an increase in domestic demand for
gold, while Graph 4 shows the effects of a supply
shift.  Notice that QS-QD determines the money
supply, so an increase in domestic demand for
gold for non-monetary uses, from D1 to D2 in
Graph 3, actually lowers the money supply of
gold used for minting.  The entire world was also
on a gold standard and the money supply would
normally equilibrate through interaction with the
exchange rate and domestic adjustments, a
complete explanation of which would be more
appropriate for another paper.  The gold standard
is relevant to this discussion as far as its limiting
effects on monetary policy to stabilize the money
supply when it was diminished by capital
outflows, reduced output and income, and
reduced spending.
Once the Depression was under way and
consumer confidence in financial markets fell due
to deflation and disruptions of debt-creditor
arrangements, the Fed’s adherence to the gold
standard allowed little in the way of policy
options to stem the amount of gold flowing out of
the U.S.   During the 1920’s under the leadership
of Benjamin Strong, head of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank, the Fed bent the rules of
the gold standard and sterilized gold inflows and
outflows with open market bond operations even
though the Fed had no federal authority to
conduct open market operations.  This kept the
money supply relatively stable despite
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fluctuations in gold inflows and outflows.  After
Strong’s death in 1928, however, the Federal
Reserve Board struggled for power with the New
York Bank.  The New York Fed was thus
prevented from using open market operations to
stem gold outflow, and the decline in the money
supply continued to cause deflation and lower
nominal incomes.  Although under normal
circumstances the gold standard stabilized the
money supply, it acted as a constraint on th Fed’s
stabilizing role during the economic uncertainty
of the Depression.
V.  DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF
DEFLATION
Thus the money supply spiraled in and out
of control downward plunge, diminishing by over a
third in less than four years (Friedman and Schwartz,
1963).  A normal period of slight deflation may
actually increase consumer confidence by increasing
real money balances, therefore boosting spending
(Mankiw, 1997).  However, during a period of
drastic and unexpected deflation, the economy is
essentially debilitated by the falling prices.
As Friedman and Schwartz point out, the
velocity of money fell by nearly one-third from 1929
to 1933.  This drastic decline in the amount of
transactions is indicative of the effects of deflation.
During deflation, debt-creditor arrangements are
disrupted and debtors, in effect, have to pay more
than expected for the money they borrowed.
Borrowing becomes a less attractive option, as
consumers begin to hold on to their money in hopes
that it will be worth more tomorrow than it is today.
Coinciding with this trend, bank failures
reduced public confidence in financial institutions.
As Friedman points out in Free to Choose, the Fed
failed to provide emergency reserves for these banks,
failing in its capacity as a lender of last resort.  The
public was less likely to spend, less likely to hold
their money in the bank, and less likely to borrow
money due to the fears caused by falling prices.  As
mentioned earlier, negative expected inflation drives
down the IS curve, reducing income and lowering
nominal interest rates while real rates rise.  Mankiw
takes note of the significance of this phenomenon,
stating that it is likely that the contraction of the
money supply and accompanying deflation led to
the observed falling income and nominal interest
rates, even if real money balances increase as a result
(1997).  This explanation sheds light on the
responsibility of the Fed; deflation caused by the
monetary contraction not only lowered income
directly but also reduced spending by causing
uncertainty and depressing investment.
VI.  INSTITUTIONAL CORRECTIONS
AND CONCLUSION
Fortunately, the government instituted
several much needed reforms beginning in 1932
with the election of Franklin Roosevelt.  These and
subsequent changes revamped the Federal Reserve
system into what we observe today.
First among these corrections was the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1932, which expanded the Federal
Reserves abilities to back its note issues.  When
Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, he followed on
March 6 by suspending the international gold
standard, thus allowing the Fed to act unimpeded
in its money stabilizing role.  Also in 1933, the
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Thomas Amendment gave the Fed power to alter
reserve requirements and expanded the President’s
role by giving him the power to require open market
purchases and to set the gold and silver dollar
weights.  The last alteration of the year, the Banking
Act of 1933, witnessed the first change to the Fed’s
organization by limiting the power of individual
Federal Reserve Banks (Wheelock, 1998).  The
Banking Act of 1935 finally reorganized the Fed’s
Open Market Committee and improved the Board
of Governors authority vis a vis the member banks.
These acts attempted to strengthen the role of the
Federal Reserve as a security against the threat of
another Great Depression.  By 1939, real GNP had
recovered to $209.4 billion and the money supply
was back to $34.2 billion, both larger than the 1929
figures.  The next decade would see a World War
that would unify the country and boost spending,
but the circumstances of the 1920s left a powerful
legacy on the regulatory functions of the government
and the Federal Reserve’s role in the economy.
The Great Depression revealed the
weaknesses of monetary policy and prompted
necessary institutional reforms.  The modern
behaviors of the Fed can be traced to lessons learned
from its ineptitude during The Great Depression.
For one, the U.S. never returned to the gold standard
domestically, and later abandoned the international
gold standard in 1973.  Implications for today’s gold
standard proponents should be clear: a hands-off
approach of fixed gold weights results in uncertainty
regarding undesirable monetary fluctuations.  In
addition, Alan Greenspan and the Fed maintain a
“hawkish” eye on fluctuations in the price level in
order to preserve stable economic growth.  It is
evident that The Great Depression redefined the
monetary policy and catalyzed the evolution of the
Federal Reserve System.
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